PGM-XX: Treasury Management #5

Paladin Governance Management (PGM) PGM - Unapproved
1

Summary: Discuss topics related to treasury management strategies & Warlord infrastructure.

Context: The PIP-11 is introducing the Warlord components and discussing potential infrastructure design improvements. This PGM will discuss Warlord launch strategies, treasury management, WAR distribution and DAO profitability & treasury distribution.

Rationale: The topics discussed on PGM-17 were almost all tackled over the past weeks/months such as:

  • Improve the Paladin ecosystem growth (Quest amount growing + monthly updates + communication on Lens),
  • Accumulate stables (Discussed in PGM-30: Treasury Management #4)
  • Allocate strategic assets (Discussed on PGM-25 & 27 and executed)
  • Build Warlord (Discussed on PIP-11 & In work by the Mithras Labs)
  • Create a legal entity used by the DAO (Voted PIP-10 & In work by the Paladin team)
  • Retroactive grant & compensation for contributors (Discussion started on PGM-26)

As mentioned on the PIP-11, this proposal will focus on the following topics:

  1. Strategic treasury deposit discussion to bootstrap Warlord and mint WAR
  2. WAR allocation if treasury mint (held on Warlord Msigs or distributed)
  3. Profitability threshold to enable enable WAR & treasury distribution
  4. Strategic assets yield management on Warlord Msigs

These discussions will help finalize the Warlord strategies before the release.

I) Strategic treasury deposit discussion to bootstrap Warlord and mint WAR

PIP-11 considers deploying the Warlord infra and adding WAR mint cap on both assets to begin with and a redeem module. The Paladin DAO could decide to deposit part/all of its strategic assets on Warlord lock contracts or to keep growing its strategic treasury managed by the Warlord committee.

My thoughts on this point will change depending on the redeem implementation discussed in PIP-11, but i’ll describe all situations and why I think it’s very dangerous for the DAO to keep the proposed design:

a) Implementation of redeem with small exit penalty

Mithras Labs suggested implementing a redeem feature allowing to burn WAR to get AURA and CVX redeemable with a small fee, which is good for external users but there would be huge risks of treasury attacks so the DAO should not deposit on Warlord to avoid it.

In this case, the strategic holdings should continue to be managed on the Warlord multisigs by the committee.

b) Removal of the redeem feature

Accumulating a strong voting influence takes time and the DAO started very recently.
Growth would be much more complex if we risk any locker redeeming the strategic assets.

In my opinion, the DAO goals should always be to avoid governance attacks & increase the backing value (which means relock until voted otherwise and no redeem possibility). In this case, the Paladin DAO could safely deposit but this would reduce some interest for external users.

C) Implementation of the redeem feature with a serious exit penalty

Implementing a serious exit penalty considerably reduces the risks by dissuading anyone to redeem. In which case, the DAO could deposit part of its strategic assets on Warlord contracts & manage the remaining on the multisigs.

II) WAR allocation if treasury mint (held on Warlord Msigs or distributed)

If the Paladin DAO decides to deposit on Warlord (which could be dangerous if the redeem with small exit fee is implemented), the warlord multisig would mint WAR tokens.

In this scenario, Mithras Labs suggested distributing it to hPAL lockers but an alternative solution could be to accumulate the WAR on the Warlord multisigs, which can do retroactive airdrop with a portion of the WAR accumulated once it’s not critically impacting the strategic voting power anymore.

Several options should be considered here:

  • Either consider using the infrastructure for the DAO treasury and remove the redeem module

  • Or, short term: Keep managing the DAO strategic voting power by the committee, to deploy the Warlord infrastructure proposed (with a potential exit fee increase)

  • Mid term: Fork the Warlord infra by removing WAR mint & redeem modules, and dedicated to the Paladin treasury which protects from governance attacks and automatize part of the management.

III) Profitability threshold to enable WAR & treasury distribution

Mithras Labs suggested a potential WAR airdrop for hPAL lockers, as well as depositing some strategic assets in Warlord infrastructure, which makes it redeemable and similar to a treasury distribution. I would be the first to support this if the treasury was in a healthy state, but not in these conditions:

While the non PAL treasury is worth 730,000$, 75% of this value is materialized by debts:

  • 100 ETH (180,000$) loan from Mithras Labs (Used to fund the POL strategies)
  • 320,000 USDC loan from Mimo Labs (Used to avoid liquidation on Ondo)
  • 48,000 USDC interests to pay for Mimo loan

Additionally, PGM-17 voted for a 2M stables accumulation target, which would set the minimal threshold after which treasury distribution could be considered would be 2,5M$.

However, I believe the DAO should vote for a more conservative threshold enabling it to secure a good treasury and incentivization of the Paladin ecosystem pillars.

Additionally, another threshold for governance influence should also be defined before considering to deposit part of the strategic assets & make it redeemable.

IV) Strategic assets yield management on Warlord Msigs

Assuming that all strategic assets managed by the committee are generating revenues, we can estimate a yield generated in cvxCRV, cvxFXS, auraBAL, bb-a-USD as native yield and USDC from Quest votes incentives for the vlCVX & vlAURA positions.

vlCVX base APR is 2,32% paid in cvxCRV & cvxFXS + 25% APR in USDC
9,1K vlCVX would generate 1,182$ + 12,740$ = 13,922$

vlAURA base APR is 3,35% paid in auraBAL + 37% APR in USDC
11,8K vlAURA would generate 1,320$ + 13,970$ = 15,291$

While the Paladin revenues will grow over time, 29K$/year is very limited to consider distributing part of the treasury (might result in a poor APR) + it’s not an appropriate time (too early) considering the DAO treasury and debts, especially if part of it will be sold for ETH to cover gas costs of the Warlord infra.

In my opinion, the remaining yield generated in non-strategic assets on the Warlord multisigs should either be used to pay back the loan and accumulate the stable treasury needed.
An alternative option could be to fully compound this yield in the vlAURA & vlCVX strategies.

Strategies updates proposed:

  • Depending on redeem & exit fee, discuss if strategic assets should be allocated to Warlord or not for now
  • Postone initial distribution by holding WAR on Warlord MS if treasury allocation (retroactive airdrop later)
  • Minimal profitability threshold for WAR & treasury distribution set to 2,5M$ stables (higher threshold recommended).
  • Minimal governance influence threshold to start minting WAR (if redeem implemented)
  • Use the yield in non-strategic assets to pay back & accumulate stables (or compound)

This PGM might be split into several proposals for clarity purposes.

Means:
Potential audit cost

Voting Options:

Yes, implement the updates
No, rework proposal
Abstain

PGM XX - Treasury Management #5 ?
  • Yes, implement updates
  • No, rework the proposal
  • Abstain
0 voters
2

As I already answered for the questions around the Redeem Module in the other discussion, I will not repeat myself here.

I agree on the fact that the DAO should already discuss and decide on the allocation of strategic assets (CVX & AURA) to be deposited in Warlord, and the amount for the initial deposit + the share of each month farm to be deposited periodically.

Concerning the allocation of WAR minted by the DAO, I think allowing to distribute WAR to hPAL holders is a nice step in the growth of the overall protocol, and I would like to remind that it only concerns a part of the strategic assets the DAO holds & farms currently, not all of it.
But I also understand the point of holding those minted WAR in the Treasury to earn the yield and grow the DAO Treasury through the WAR staking.
I think we should discuss of a split for the WAR minted (initial mint + other periodical mints) between what should be held in the Treasury, and what should be distributed to hPAL lockers. This will allow us to test both solutions at the same time, ans see the results of both directly. And later on, we can start another discussion to adapt that split, based on the results of it and the state of the DAO Treasury at that point.

3

I think it wouldn’t be a great image if we deployed Warlord, but then didn’t trust it enough for the DAO to deposit its strategic assets and mint WAR tokens.
The DAO could vote to decide if an Audit should be a prerequisite, or if a partial allocation of the treasury is sufficiently prudent as a short term start.

If I understand correctly what you describe as a “governance attack”, it doesn’t sound like the issue is the redemption mechanism, but more the potential airdrop of WAR to current hPAL lockers and if a few of them (with the largest airdrop) decided to redeem the underlying tokens. Could the details of the airdrop be tweaked to mitigate that risk? If users already committed to lock their hPal for 2 years, why would they now decide to burn WAR tokens and wait a full 16 weeks rather than just enjoy the proceeds for the voting power that they control? (btw, are users still receiving a yield during that 16 week waiting period following the redemption /while tokens are getting unlocked)?

I agree with what has been said already: if we think that attracting external users to mint WAR is worthwhile (for the DAO to collect additional fees while only adding a minimum of additional work), then I wouldn’t implement the exit fee. It is important for users to have the possibility to back out if they chose so.
If we insist on having an exit fee, why no have it reduce progressively over time. For example, the minter would start with a 5% exit fee which would then progressively trend down to 0.5% or even 0% after x weeks?)

One last question that popped in my head is the loan from Mithras Labs. What is the debt denominated in? Is it 100 ETH regardless of the euro equivalent, or is it a Euro amount (for example, 250k euros = value of 100 ETH back in March 2022 or 180k euro which is the value of 100 ETH as of today). This is an important detail when deciding to accumulate a treasury in Stablecoins, in ETH or a combination of both.

4

As explained earlier, I’m strongly against any distribution at the moment, especially if the redeem is implemented.
As for strategic assets allocation from the DAO into Warlord, I believe it should be not more than 5-10% of holdings if the WAR minted are not held by the multisig.

The yield can also be earned from the multisig directly, we’d have the same operation to do anyway since we’d have to sell non strategic assets earned to stables in both cases and either compound in other DAO strategies or sell the auraBAL/cvxCRV received.

Anyway, if the WAR minted are staked by the multisig, then we could consider increasing the allocation, but the first goal of the DAO should be to accumulate a stable & strategic treasury at the moment.

I disagree, there should be no split and no distribution to hPAL lockers in the current setup, everything should stay in the treasury to grow until reaching a defined threshold (which can be discussed).

As for any WAR mint by the treasury, in the current setup I disagree too, but it will depend on both if the redeem is implemented and how would be managed the WAR minted.
Considering that the redeem seems important for external users, either all the WAR minted should be managed by the multisig if an allocation is decided, or the DAO should just continue to manage its strategies without changes.

It’s not a question of image or trusting the product, but to avoid trusting humans about doing what’s good for the protocol rather than for themselves.

My goal of Warlord was initially to make the strategic voting power accumulation more efficient and growing because of no redeem feature.
Building a good treasury takes time, which is why we created the multisig and started the strategies voted in PGM 25 & 27 to strart earning before even deciding the final design or developpement of Warlord.

With the redeem & distribution propositions, this is not fitting the strategy which is why it might be better to just not use it or at least keep the management of the assets by the DAO until the treasury is in a better state.

An audit is not mandatory but can be discussed. However considering that Mithras Labs would not handle it, this would add a 50-70k expense for the DAO treasury which would requires to sell assets.

Not only current holders, if the current strategies are moved even partially to Warlord and if WAR are periodically distributed then first the treasury would not grow as fast anymore, and other holders could lock PAL, receive WAR & redeem underlying…

What people usually do with airdrop ? Sell
How to sell this airdrop, especially if no liquidity ? Redeem & sell underlying

Now to answer more seriously to your question, if you think about people who bought & locked PAL at a higher price than the current one and receive an airdrop redeemable for underlying liquid assets, don’t you think they would just think about selling it to offset the cost of the locked position ?

Alternatively, and this also answers the second part fo your question, WAR stakers don’t control the voting power of the underlying assets, it is delegated.

However, PAL lockers can also be involved in governance influence and not only looking for yield, in this case, for someone who already have PAL locked but also CVX/AURA locked personally, what’s the rationale for not redeeming & relocking personally to fully control the voting & gauge power associated ?

This question would fit more in the PIP-11 because it concerns the app design, and I’ll let @Mithras_Labs answer it

Agree, as long as the DAO does not mint & distribute WAR for now.

This loan is denominated in ETH, without interest or deadline to pay back iirc; and it was used to launch the protocol owned liquidity strategies.

There are currently 161 ETH in the PAL-ETH pool deposited on Convex, including 66 on the community multisig and 95 in the collateral multisig meaning these funds are still in the treasury, but it would seriously impact the PAL liquidity and the protocol revenues if we were to pay it back now, so the goal is to accumulate Stables to pay back Mimo loan and ETH to pay back Mithras loan.
(Both assets would also be accumulated to build the treasury once paid back ofc)

5

Doesn’t exist.

Yeah, which is why this product is not made for the DAO’s treasury, as clearly highlighted in PIP-11.
Also, CVX and Aura represent ~10% of Paladin treasury, so I think the worry is pretty overstated. If the OP had waited for the actually PGM dedicated to the topic, he would have seen that the distribution of WAR was suggested over a 6 month period, and because WAR has a 4 month max-cooldown, Paladin would be distributing 10% of its current assets while earning new fees greatly compensating the above.

Paladin is not an Olympus fork, nor a hedge fund, there is no asset backing the PAL price. Seems to be a terrible route to venture into.

This is highly deceptive as they are owed over 12 months and 1 installment was already paid.

As a founder it is hard to see such proposals posted in the forums, as they are not proposals, but comments to proposals that we intended to post. In essence, there is noting asked for the DAO here except waiting as no thresholds were offered as a starting point. It is just a way to pre-empt the 2 part of PIP-11 that was supposed to ask the DAO to deposit 80,000$ of CVX & AURA over 6 months to boostrap the product. This was planned in the following fashion:

image
image832Ă—479 23.8 KB

There a ton of good suggestions in the above proposal so I would like to use them to craft a better proposal. The idea here will be to find a compromise between rigorous treasury management and Warlord bootsrapping.

Instead of locking newly farmed CVX and AURA we could lock WAR as a DAO and start the distribution once we hit the 25k$ of the first month. This would have zero impact on current financial situation and enable to start creating additional utility for hPAL lockers.

2 Likes
6

As precised in the post, what I call the committee is represented by the multisig(s) for locked tokens & the signers, which both exist.

I’m not the one who started to call these the Warlord multisigs, but I guess it’s better to start referring to it as Locked Tokens multisig like when it was created.

It was clearly stated in the article and in the comments of the PIP-11 that the core team suggestion was to deposit treasury in Warlord too.

I’m assuming we’re taking non PAL treasury, in which case it’s actually 11,9%
image

However if we’re taking debt into account, the CVX & AURA share are significantly increasing:

image

As a reminder, the 100 ETH loan has no deadline or interest, so this is framing the worst case scenario if we were to pay back everything.
However, the Mimo loan has to be paid back in 11 months, paying up to 4k$ of interest per month depending on potential anticipated payback.

Additionally, the main reason of why I’d like to grow the strategic assets and avoid starting a distribution now is because over time, it’s possible to reduce the main PAL outflow (the Quests) by voting & filling it directly.

This would allow the DAO to reduce significantly the PAL selling pressure and sustain a good APR on the Paladin related pools.

I understand that point, but I believe 6 months is a bit short to estimate that the treasury state will be high enough to start self sustain at least part of the costs, which is why I suggested to define threshold and rediscuss distrubution once reached.

For the Stable/ETH part, I suggest at least 2,5M minimum for the following reasons:

  • 500k would be used to pay back all debts
  • 2M would be used as runaway over 2 years (including part of the Paladin core team currently paid by Mithras Labs, and the DAO contributors)

However I believe this threshold should be higher to allow more margin.

As for the strategic assets threshold is a bit harder to define but i’d say:

  • AURA: At least 0,4% of the vlAURA supply (currently 0,08% held by the DAO)
    This would allow to fill around 20% of both PAL-USDC & palStkAAVE-AAVE quests, and allow to always have the 0,2% quorum needed per gauge for vlAURA to count on the vote.

Above that, I believe part of the AURA earned (up to 50%) could be deposited on Warlord & distributed, while the remaining should be either delegated to earn USDC, or deposited on Warlord but without distributing it.

  • auraBAL: This is the 2nd AURA yield stream after the PAL-USDC POL.
    Hard to estimate a treshold on this one but I believe the strategy should keep running until the AURA treshold is reached, then the position could be reduced if needed.

  • CRV & CVX: The DAO currently holds 155K CRV mostly on the collateral multisig.
    If locked, this represents 10% of the Quest on PAL-ETH but it would require a whitelist and long time locked. The DAO also holds 8,6k vlCVX (which represent 45k veCRV votes)

Assuming all CRV are sold for CVX over time (without premium), 200k veCRV votes could fill 13% of the current Quest. I didn’t took discount into account but this will increase over time with the POL & st-yCRV strategies.

We could also aim for 20% filled so around 300k veCRV votes, and same as AURA, up to 50% of the tokens earned after this could be deposited on Warlord and distributed, while the remaining would be delegated for USDC, or deposited on Warlord without distirbuting it.

  • veTETU: This position is currently delegated but not included into Warlord because of the veToken design. It’s currently earning USDC & imo this should remain this way until the stable treasury treshold is reached.

After that, I believe the DAO could stop relock and decide if this should be converted for vlAURA (depending on the rates, underlying votes between both, and AURA treshold), sold or distributed.

  • veAPW: Same as veTETU, not included in Warlord because of the veToken design.
    I believe its too early to take a decision on this asset considering that the V2 is about to go live but not many informations have been revealed yet.

So to resume:

  • Accumulate at least 0,4% of the vlAURA supply (covering 20% of both quests) in vlAURA, which will also reduce the PAL expenses by the same ratio.

  • Progressively pay back Mimo loan, retrieve CRV & convert for CVX locked to cover 20% of the PAL-ETH quest, and reducing the PAL expense by the same ratio.

  • Accumulate stables with non strategic assets and votes incentives delegated until at least 2,5M$ (including all debt paid back)

  • Consider distributing up to 50% of the revenues once these threshold are reached

  • Wait & see for veAPW

I never spoke about OHM fork or hedge fund ?

As for the value backing it might be a wrong formulation but what I meant is the healthier the treasury is, the better it will be for PAL appreciation I guess.

This is not forking ohm or being a fund, i’m just supporting DAO treasury management & optimization imo.

You right I forgot to deduce 1 month (one of the data manually updated in my sheet sorry) however I explained that this would be paid over 12 months and can be reduced.

I think this comment details everything pretty well, my bad if I wasn’t clear enough.

80K$ represents the quasi totality of the CVX & AURA holdings, which is why I’m against depositing now if it means distributing it and losing the yield.

Happy to collaborate on this proposal to present a good compromise to the community, I believe the details outlined above can be interesting too.

You mean stake WAR ?
25K$ of what ?
Not sure about the impact since I didn’t fully inderstood the alternative.

Again, I’m not fully against depositing if the WAR are controled by the DAO, as long as the yield is retained and the strategic assets underlying are not redeemable. (However I’d like to follow the strategy explained above and reach the threshold before starting a distribution, which will be much interesting at this point anyway.)

However, if you absolutely want to do an airdrop to bootstrap the product (which can make sense) I’d like to suggest another option:
A retroactive hPAL airdrop vested for early depositors on Warlord, let me explain why:

  1. The PAL holdings is representing 89% of the total treasury, and beside the small part in POL, is not generating revenue compared to the 11% of remaining.
    An airdrop of the governance token would not hurt the treasury earning as much as distributing the strategic assets at the moment.

  2. This solution would attract new depositors not familiar with the project and would increase the decentralization by increasing the amount of hPAL holders

  3. Using hPAL over PAL for the airdrop could reduce the selling pressure because of the 10 days cooldown, and because people could hold PAL to vote considering it’s related to Warlord where they deposited.

  4. Adding a vesting on the airdrop could also help to spread & reduce the potential selling pressure over time.

  5. These new hPAL lockers could be interested to lock their hPAL if they follow the governance forum as they would know that long term goal is to distribute part of the revenues

The amount should definitely be discussed, but I believe it’s a much better solution than distributing WAR just yet. A snapshot could be done a few weeks/month after the Warlord release to distribute the hPAL airdrop vested to every depositors.

4 Likes
7

Thank you for that extremely thorough and thoughtful. The main points about distribution seem very reasonable and ought to be included in the general logic.

On a personal I highly disagree we should hold the accumulation of non ETH/stable assets as a core target. We are doing it because there a significant opportunities with our PoL strategy. However it should not be conceptualized as an evergreen strategy where we lock and it will run by itself. This is disingenuous as more and more tokens are locked daily while de emissions are slashed on a yearly basis. In essense, it would force us into a constant chase straying us away from our main focus: governance infrastructure.
Additionally this is a totally different idea than the initial potential WAR distribution and I would rather see it discussed in another proposal.

Mithras Labs has been working on an alternative that should be a good compromise.

Looking forward to see how the discussions flow!

8

After seeing your feedbacks, and with the goal of balancing out the growth of the treasury via Warlord while bringing more utility to hPAL locking, we’d like to offer a new alternative for WAR distribution to hPAL Lockers : esWAR

esWAR is an escrowed version of the WAR token, still able to receive the yield from WAR staking, while not allowing the esWAR to be transferable (meaning those WAR will not be able to be used in the Redeem module), and even blocking the possibility for vesting and converting esWAR back to WAR until the DAO decides to.

After vesting is activated, a vesting duration will be decided, and will allow esWAR holders to vest their tokens for X weeks, after which they can convert them back to WAR.
The esWAR logic will also allow to “clawback” a part of the yield from stkWAR before distributing to esWAR. This means if a 30% clawback is decided, the esWAR will only receive 70% of the stkWAR yield, and the rest of the yield will be absorbed by the DAO Treasury instead.

1600Ă—932 131 KB

By coupling this system with a split before distribution of any WAR minted by the DAO, this will allow a more flexible strategy, that could have 3 phases, based on the growth of both Warlord & the DAO Treasury :

  • Phase 1 : Accumulation => The DAO keeps 50% of all minted WAR from the Treasury to farm with it. The other 50% will be distributed via esWAR to hPAL Lockers, based on their Lock state. And esWAR will have a 50% clawback on the yield (meaning only half of the stkWAR yield is distributed via esWAR, the other 50% are sent to the treasury to accumulate more assets)

  • Phase 2 : Rewards => The split on minted WAR stays the same (50/50), but the clawback on esWAR yield is reduced over time, until no clawback, at which point the esWAR yield becomes the exact same as stkWAR yield

  • Phase 3 : Distribution => esWAR vesting is enabled by the DAO, allowing esWAR holders to vest and convert them back to WAR (vesting duration to be decided). Depending on the Treasury state, the split on minted WAR can also be changed to distribute more to hPAL Lockers

(WAR mint shares & clawback values can be adjusted based on the DAO decision, to have a system to fits the DAO the best)

1 Like
9

If no other comments arise, vote will start in 24h.

10

I’m not a big fan of this last suggestion (esWAR, clawback and vesting), it seems overly complicated, and there are just so many parameters left to be decided (duration and starting %age of the clawback, duration of the vesting… etc). As an hPal locker, I’d be happy to forget about a potential airdrop and just let the team further develop the product and roll out more features.
Not letting users redeem (or applying a high exit fee) will probably also push away potential users who would have been curious about minting WAR tokens themselves…. we’ll see.
It’s a bit disappointing that there is not more participation on this forum, especially from those that are delegates. I would have been curious to hear more opinions on this, but I guess between the 3 participants on this thread, there is enough votes to push this through and reach a quorum, so we might as well get it over with and move on.

1 Like
11

I believe there is a huge difference between having it as a core target in the long term vs aiming for a short term accumulation used to sustain our own treasury strategies et reduce costs.

As mentioned, I believe the most important is to have a base to sustain the Paladin related pools. Once done, while I believe that the DAO should not distribute 100% at this point, part could be distributed while the remaining would be delegated to accumulate stablecoins & ETH.

This is why I support the election of a committee dedicated to manage the strategic assets of the DAO, and allowing others contributors & team to focus on governance infrastructure & protocol growth.
Maybe this committee could work with the association once ready & elected by the DAO ? (Not sure, maybe @hu_bo can highlight if possible ?)

Additionally, having a automated infrastructure and dedicated to the DAO would help a lot (could be a Warlord fork with some updates, allowing to not modify the inital product proposed)

This is a PGM about treasury management discussing different topics, based on the information in the article and personal thoughts about the situation. To clarify, this proposal will be split into different topics:

5-1: Define a stable/ETH threshold before distribution considerations
5-2: Define a strategic assets treshold before distirbution considerations
5-3: Strategic assets committee discussion
5-4: Consider an airdrop of vested hPAL to bootstrap Warlord
5-5: Discuss if strategic treasury allocation to Warlord

I’ll try to draft & publish these next week, hopefully it will bring some clarity and recap the topics discussed here.

Thanks for the proposition, while this should be discussed in PIP-11 as it seems more of a design feature (because as I understand it both WAR and esWAR would exist in your proposal), this could be considered in the future as it solves part of the issues (The stable/Eth accumulation).

However, this is too early because it is excluding the other main issue, which is that the DAO would not control its own gauge power anymore (which completely excludes & prevents to pursue the treasury strategies outlined above)

Once the strategic assets threshold is reached (if voted) part of the new strategic assets earned could be deposited in Warlord and distributed as esWAR, allowing to retain most of the yield to reach the Stable/Eth threshold, while starting to distribute part of the earnings redeemable after a period and earning some yield.

You assume that all strategic assets would be deposited on Warlord with a split between WAR & esWAR but this is off topic as my point is to not deposit, and especially not everything on Warlord for now, and until the treasury is in a better state.

I believe this is way too early to vote on a topic so confused and where there is no clear consensus

Of course the Paladin community don’t need it as they know about the produts, the goal of an airdrop is to attract new users to the community

To clarify, the only reason of why I proposed this, was in the case of the DAO would absolutely want to deposit its strategic asets treasury in it, but we’ve been considering several other options allowing to reach the DAO goals over time while not changing the initial new product proposed which I support because its very interesting for small holders.

I’m sorry for my late reply I got very little time available over the past few days and missed the last community call. I’d also like to see other delegates getting involved indeed.

I disagree, severals ideas where mentionned and that it was just a first discussion, but just pushing everything in one proposal will confuse everyone, especially considering that there is no consensus for now

Additionally, while you might be right about the voting power capacity, my goal is not to push something that the community disagree with, and I believe the work on the governance framework as well as the clarity & transparency of the DAO actions definitely shows that the goal is to involve everyone in the discussions and always try to reach a consensus on the forum

12

As mentioned by French Tony, it seems we are erring towards too much complexity. Let’s forget about esWAR and disitribution and focus on depositing assets in WAR, can we at least agree to this?

13

As mentioned above, let’s discuss and vote on the different topics in sub proposals and reconsider this question after

14

Additionally, this proposal is about several topics, I would appreciate if you don’t avoid it to only discuss the last point announced before even voting on it

I’m strongly against depositing the treasury strategic assets at the moment because it’s way too early (I outlined why & proposed several alternatives), so i’d like to see the people voting the opposite to manifest themselves in this topic to explain their reasoning and be sure they fully understand what it means for the treasury strategies

15
  • Yes, deposit all available CVX & AURA into WAR
  • Yes, but a partial allocation to be determined
  • No, I disagree with this strategy

0 voters

16

Replaced by PGM-31: PGM-31 :Allocation of resources in Warlord