PURe RFP : Creation and election of an Incentive Allocation Committee

Summary : Hand off incentive management to a community multisig of 2 elected members and one core team representative.

Context :
After introducing LM and adjusting it has become obvious that we had to accelerate the decentralization of the control over the DAO. As such, we recommend the creation of a committee that will manage the allocation of incentives (after the budget has been validated by the DAO).

Rationale :
Controlling allocation is a huge factor of success for a protocol, and one of the main centers of costs of a DAO. By relinquishing control over this key part of development, the core team hopes to empower the community and let them participate more heavily in the operations of the protocol.

Means :
Create a new PaladinController Implementation exclusively for LM allocation.

Sustainability :
This proposal is not only valid for the ongoing campaign but also for the ones coming afterwards. Furthermore, the committee’s responsibility will increase as incentives will extend to other options as the protocol grows.

Thoughts ? Once we have found a suitable solution we will move on pushing it out after we’re sure it doesn’t compromise the current operations of the protocol


How will you judge trustability? How will you ‘vet’ these community members? I’m all ears.

I support this proposal.

Further decentralizing the protocol and empowering the community are wins.

What will the election process look like? Also - what is the threshold on the multisig?

@source3v17 once we know the multisig threshold I can try to answer your question.

1 Like

Your concern is valid here. The best way to approach this is to limit powers without handcuffing the committee (which would make it meaningless). I suggest that we have some max allocation, which the community is comfortable with over some period (I recommend weekly or monthly). We then enumerate all the areas we would like rewards to be directed to (e.g. aave, stkaave, idle, comp, uni pool, etc.) and the committee is responsible for allocating the max allocation among those pools.

For example:
Note: numbers are just hypothetical

Community Driven Parameters

Max Allocation: 100k PAL / month

Committee Driven Parameters

Aave: 20%
stkAave: 10%
Comp: 10%
Uni: 10%
Idle: 10%
Unallocated: 50%

This will make the committee’s job more straight forward and mitigate the risk to the community while avoiding handcuffing them. If the committee wants to change the max rewards, the can ask the community and provide justification. There should also be a financial incentive to be a committee member, although I expect it would not be a full time job - so either we consider adding responsibilities or we make it a modest monthly pay.

  1. I also support this proposal - moving in the right direction (further decentralization)

  2. I like the approach of @jakelynch regarding the limit of power and probably we would also need to have some incentives for the committee. Additionally, there could always be the possibility to do an “emergency vote” by the community.

  3. @Figue: How did you come up with the # of committee members?

  4. Adding on the election/running process:
    How long should be members part of the committee (e.g. do we want to have a rotation after a certain period of time?)
    How should a replacement process be ( e.g. if a member voluntarily wants to leave the DAO)?


My general thought is that we should avoid creating over administration, let’s not recreate TradFI.

Of course, committee member would receive PAL payment since their job will be to create a bi-weekly proposal of incentive balancing. I think 3 members would be the right amount, enough to be operationally active. Every proposal would be ran through optimistic governance and it would be possible to run a veto vote to replace committee members at any moment. (this is my personal view of how it would work)

Right now this committee is talked of for the remaining 2 months of the LM campaign. There is no more incentives currently planned, it will be up to governance to decide if more are needed, imo, no need to over distribute if we reach our goals.


I support the general idea, all good!

Regarding veto vs. max allocation, it’s one or the other I guess. I tend to favor veto since it reduces friction (having to vote on a max value, possibly change it over time). However, if “bi-weekly” means twice a week and not every other week, the veto safety mechanism might be tricky (friction is back for the core team or whoever has veto power). Plus if you need to adjust this setting twice a week, the veto window may slow down things too much.

One last thought:

Of course, committee members would receive PAL payment since their job will be to create a bi-weekly proposal of incentive balancing

Why would they submit a proposal, if optimistic governance is being used? It would be easier to have them triggering a multisig tx, using for instance Gnosis Zodiac modules for veto or max spending.

Think it’s safe to assume biweekly = every other week in this context.